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No. 6890. In Bank. May 
EDWARD J. VOLF et al., Respondents, 
ACCIDENT AND GUARAN'l'EE 
L'l'D. (a Corporation), Appellant. 
1958.] 
v. THE OCEAN 
COHPORATION, 
[1] Insurance-Risks and Causes of Loss-Indemnity Insurance-
Injury to Property.--\Vhere the insured contractor, under a 
comprehensive liability policy excluding injury to "property 
in the care, custody or control of the insured," to a product 
"manufactured, sold, handled or distributed ... by the named 
insured" and to "work completed by ... the named insured," 
constructed a stucco house but, because of the use of defective 
cement, cracks appeared in the stucco while the insured was 
constructing the house and before the owner took possession, 
and the insured put a new stucco exterior over the old at addi-
tional cost, the loss to the insured was excluded and it was 
immaterial whether or not the owner of the building became 
the owner of the stucco. 
[2] !d.-Risks and Causes of Loss-Indemnity Insurance-Injury 
to Property.-A comprehensive liability policy excluding 
coverage to property in the care, custody or control of the 
insured contractor and work completed by him was not reason-
ably susceptible of the interpretation that the exclusion clauses 
did not preclude recovery of the loss to the insured by reason 
of his placing a new stucco exterior over the old to replace 
defective stucco work, and the wife's testimony that they 
wanted "full coverage as far as materials and workmanship" 
were concerned and that they wanted "the most coverage for 
as much, what we could afford" did not support that interpreta-
tion where there was no discussion of particular risks or ex-
clusions and the insured and his wife accepted the policy and 
renewed it the following year without objection. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Cala-
veras County. J. A. Smith, Judge. Reversed with directions. 
Action on a comprehensive liability insurance policy. Judg-
ment for plaintiffs reversed with directions. 
Alexander, Bacon & Mnndhenk, William F. Stone, Paul A. 
Unsworth, and Honey, Mayall & Hurley for .Appellant. 
Gordon ,J. Aulik for Respondents. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Insurance, §§ 506, 509 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Insurance, § 1225 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Insurance,§ 189. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff Edward J. a con-
constructed a stucco house in San Andreas for A. P. 
Hoover. A stucco exterior finish for a house consists of three 
coats: a "scratch" coat, which is a mixture of sand, cement 
and water applied inch to inch thick; a "brown" coat, 
which is a similar mixture of the same thickness; and a ''color'' 
or "finish" which is like a paint wash applied with a 
trowel about thick. The ''scratch'' coat went on with-
out incident. The "brown" coat would not stick to the 
"scratch" coat so Volf returned the mixture to the Neilsen 
Company for replacement. He mixed the new ingredients in 
the proper proportions and applied the "brown" coat. The 
mixture did not meet Volf's expectations but he assumed that 
it would be all right. ~'\fter applying the "brown" coat, he 
applied the finish or "color" coat. Shortly before the build-
was completed and possession taken by Hoover, cracks ap-
peared in the exterior stucco of the building and Hoover 
complained. Hoover and Volf then agreed that if the cracks 
did not get worse Hoover would accept the building and Volf 
would fill in and paint over the cracks if necessary. When the 
rain came, the cracks became worse and Hoover called in the 
State Contracting Board. Tasts showed that the stucco was 
of the right mixture but below compressive strength and that 
the cracking occurred in the "scratch" and "brown" coats. 
The board decided in favor of Hoover and Volf put a new 
stucco exterior over the old at an additional cost to him of 
$1,309.15. 
Defendant had issued to plaintiffs a comprehensive liability 
insurance policy that contained, among other provisions, the 
following clause:" CovERAGE D-PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY 
-ExcEPT AuTOMOBILE. To pay on behalf of the insured all 
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay 
as damages because of injury to or destruction of property, 
including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident.'' The 
policy also contained certain exclusions. The pertinent part 
of "Exclusion (g)" provided that the policy did not apply 
under coverage "D" to injury to or destruction of " ( 3) . 
property in the care, custody or control of the insured, or 
( 4) any goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or 
distributed ... by the named insured, or work completed 
by . . . the named insured, out of which the accident 
arises. e • • ' ' 
Plaintiffs brought this action to recover the cost of the new 
stucco exterior. The trial court entered judgment for plain-
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tiffs, and defendant insurance company The only issue 
involved is the coverage afforded by the policy. 
[1] We agree with defendant that the injury was excluded 
under ''Exclusion '' of the policy, even if it is assumed 
that it was otherwise included under coverage D. Since the 
defective cement was used and the cracks appeared in the 
stucco while V olf was constructing the house and before 
Hoover took possession, the loss was occasioned by ''injury to 
. . . property in the care, custody or control of the insured'' 
and is therefore excluded under Exclusion (3). The in-
jury is also excluded under Exclusion ( 4), for it was to a 
product "manufactured, sold, handled or distributed ... by 
the named insured'' as well as to ''work completed by . . . 
the named insured.'' 
Ha1tenstein v. Saint Paul-Merc1try Indern. Co., 242 Minn. 
354 [65 N.W.2d 122, 125], and Heyward v. Arner·ican Cas-
ualty Co. of Reading, Pa., 129 F.Supp. 4, 8, invoked by plain-
tiffs, actually support defendant. In the Hauenstein case the 
plaintiffs were distributors of a certain type of plaster. They 
were insured by defendant for property damage under a clause 
similar to coverage D in the instant policy, which was subject 
to an exclusion identical to the products exclusion in Exclu-
sion (g) (4). The plaintiffs sold the plaster to a contractor 
who used it on a construction job. After application the 
plaster shrank and cracked, and the contractor had to remove 
it and replaster the walls and ceilings. The contractor sought 
recovery from the plaintiffs for breach of warranty. Plaintiffs 
then sought a declaratory judgment against the defendant 
casualty company. They contended that the injury to the 
plaster itself was not excluded on the grounds that after its 
application it ceased to be goods or products, and by virtue 
of the law of accession became a part of the realty. The court 
rejected this contention, stating: "The law of accession is 
important in controversies where the distinction between per-
sonalty and realty is vital, but it has no justifiable use as 
a vehicle for importing ambiguity into the language of an 
insurance contract where none otherwise exists .... Clearly 
the exclusionary clause herein is applicable to plaster as a 
product handled by plaintiffs without any limitation as to its 
changed condition by its regular and ordinary use.'' The 
court then found that aside from any injury to the plaster 
itself the building was damaged by its application because 
the plaster had to be removed so that the walls and ceilings 
could be replastered. In the instant case, however, the stucco 
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did not to be rcmovc•d and there is no evideuec and no 
that the house was reason of the 
of the defective stucco. 
In holding that an exclusion similar to Exclusion (g) in 
the instant policy had no application to personal injury the 
court in II cyward v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa., 
st~pra, stated: ''This Exclusion means that the policy will not 
the insured if he has to repair or replace some product 
or work which proved defective and caused an accident. The 
Exclusion has no reference to liability for damage to other 
property or personal injtlry arising out of such accident." 
(129 F.Supp. at p. 8.) In the instant case the plaintiffs seek 
protedion for the very thing that is specifically excluded by 
Exclusion (g), i.e., the cost to the plaintiffs of replacing the 
stucco that proved to be defective. So far as Exclusions (g) 
(3) and (g) (4) are concerned it is immaterial whether or 
not Hoover became the owner of the stucco. 
[2] Plaintiffs contend that the extrinsic evidence supports 
the interpretation that Exclusion (g) does not preclude re-
covery of the loss here involved. Mrs. Vol£ testified that 
they stated that they wanted "full coverage as far as materials 
and workmanship" were concerned and made other similar 
statements. There was no discussion of particular risks. Mrs. 
Vol£ also testified that they wanted "the most coverage for as 
much, what we could afford,'' and that cost was an item with 
respect to the purchase of insurance. She further testified that 
they stated that they wanted full coverage "like Lodato," a 
competitor, and that defendant's agent showed her I1odato 's 
policy and "we were equally covered." When questioned 
about the particular loss involved here, i.e., a situation where 
plaintiffs had done a job and had to replace it, lVIrs. V olf 
testified that there was no reference to such a situation "be-
cause we never had the need of it. vV e didn't think anything 
like that would come up." 'rhere was no discussion of the par-
ticular exclusions, but plaintiffs aecepted the policy and re-
newed it the following year without objection. Exclusion (g), 
especially Exclusion (g) (4) relating to work completed by 
the named insured, is not reasonably susceptible of the in-
terpretation contended for by plaintiffs, and the extrinsic evi-
dence does not support their position. To read the policy to 
cover the loss here involved would require that Exclusion (g) 
be omitted from the policy, but the evidence does not show, 
nor do plaintiffs claim, that they are entitled to a reformation 
of the policy omitting Exclusion (g). 
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The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court 
to enter judgment in favor of defendant. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and Mc-
Comb, J., concurred. 
CAHTER, J.-I dissent. 
It is my considered opinion that there is sufiicient evidence 
to support the findings and judgment of the trial court. That 
court found that the cement used to make the "scratch" and 
"brown" layers of the stucco application was defective and 
caused it to disintegrate. It also determined that the oral and 
documentary evidence offered to interpret the insurance con-
tract implied that the contract covered the loss. 
In reversing the judgment of the trial court the majority 
holds that the damage was within exclusion (g) of the policy 
for two reasons : 
(1) The cracks in the stucco first appeared before Mr. 
Hoover took possession of the house which was then ''property 
in the care, custody, or control of the insured.'' 
(2) The damage was to a product "manufactured, sold, 
handled or distributed . . . by the named insured'' and 
''work completed by or for the named insured.'' 
The holding of the majority is highly technical and is not 
supported by either the facts or law. 
Although the stucco was slightly cracked before Mr. Hoover 
took over the house, he and Volf agreed that the damage was 
not so serious as to require another stucco application. Only 
a bit of paint was needed to repair the damage. Only after 
Mr. Hoover moved into the house did rainfall make the dis-
integration bad enough to require a new application of stucco. 
Therefore the damage which made V olf liable for the new 
application occurred while Mr. Hoover resided in the house. 
Had the rainfall not caused this additional disintegration, 
Volf would not have been liable for the ('ost of a stucco appli-
cation. According to the majority's interpretation, exclusion 
(g) encompasses any flaws in a completed building which 
later becomes so aggravated as to require repair. It would 
also imlude damage to other parts of the same building which 
are affected by the original flaw. This is hardly consistent 
with the observation of the writer of the majority opinion 
that '' ... it must not he forgotten that the primary funetion 
of insnrauee is to insure." (Boll7.n(Jer v. National Fire Ins. 
Co., 25 Cal.2d 399, 403 1154 P.2d 399] .) 
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The majority also relies on exclusion (g) (4) which excludes 
injury to or destruction of '' ... any goods or products manu-
factured, sold, handled or distributed or premises alienated 
by the named insured, or work completed by or for the named 
insured, md of which the acciclent arises . ... " (Emphasis 
added.) 
Preliminarily it must be said that the emphasized phrase 
modifies the entire subsection and not only ''or work com-
pleted by or for the named insured. . . . '' If it were meant 
to relate only to the latter phrase the comma would properly 
be omitted. 
The trial court found that the accident arose from the ce-
ment used in the first stucco application. 'fhis exclusion may 
be construed to avoid liability for the cement itself, although 
its identity disappeared when it was mixed with other ma-
terials to make stucco. 'l'he majority has ignored the phrase 
''out of which the accident arises'' which is the key to under-
standing the holding of the trial court. l\fy disagreement with 
the majority lies here. I have four reasons for this interpreta-
tion: 
( 1) 'f he clear intent of V olf and defendant's agent was to 
provide ''full coverage as far as materials and workmanship'' 
were concerned for a building contractor. Other statements 
similar in implication to the quoted phrase were made by 
V olf and his wife in their negotiations with the agent. The 
latent defects involved in this case are typical construction 
problems. Vol£ asked for a form of complete protection and 
relied on defendant to provide it. It is hardly possible to 
enumerate the multitude of particular incidents which may 
arise out of a business so complex as that of a building con-
tractor. What was not discussed by V olf and the agent does 
not imply that those things were not meant to be covered. 
Vol£ asked for full coverage "like Lodato." This implies that 
he thought Lodato was ''fully covered.'' The agent showed 
V olf Lodato's policy and said V olf was ''equally covered.'' 
Vol£ 's reasonable interpretation of this was that both he and 
Lodato were fully covered. This oral evidence is important 
in determining the meaning of the language used in the con-
tract. 
(2) Under coverage "D" Vol£ was protected against "Prod-
ucts Hazard.'' The contract defines this as : ''. . . the han-
dling or use of, the existence of any condition in or a warranty 
of goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or dis-
tributed by the named insured, other than equipment rented 
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to or located for use of others but not sold, if the accident 
occurs after the insured has relinquished possession thereof 
to others and away from premises owned, rented or controlled 
by the insured or on premises for which the classification 
stated in the company's manual excludes any part of the fore-
going .... " 
Note that this paragraph includes coverage for " ... the 
existence of any condition in . . . goods or products manu-
factur·ed, sold, handled or d·istributed by the named in-
sured. . . . '' The majority cites this language of exclusion 
D : '' 'manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by the 
named insured' " as taking a thing out of the policy. If this 
is correct, products hazard coverage as defined in the policy 
is removed completely by the very same words in the excep-
tion! By giving meaning to the phrase ''out of which the 
accident occurred" this anomaly would be avoided. It should 
not be assumed the company, in bad faith, meant the defini-
tion of "products hazard" to be meaningless. 
(3) The meaning of the phrase "out of which the accident 
arises'' is made clearer by the fact that the person buying 
and using a defective product may recover its value from the 
seller. In this case Volf can recover the value of the defective 
cement from the Nielsen Company. This implies that the 
phrase in question applies only to the cement in this case, not 
to the other ingredients of the stucco. 
( 4) "An insurance policy is to be construed most favorably 
to the insured, in such manner as to provide full coverage of 
the indicated risk rather than to narrow the protection. (Olson 
v. Standard MaTine Ins. Co., 109 Cal.App.2d 130, 135 [240 
P.2d 379]; MilleT v. United Ins. Co., 113 Cal.App.2d 493, 497 
[248 P.2d 113]; Pendell v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 95 Cal. 
App.2d 766, 769 [214 P.2d 392] ; Fageol Truck & Coach Co. 
v. Pacific Indem. Co., 18 Cal.2d 748, 751 [117 P.2d 669] .) The 
courts will not sanction a construction of the insurer's lan-
guage that will defeat the very purpose or object of the insur-
ance. (MilleT v. United Ins. Co., supm, at p. 497; NaTveT v. 
CalifoTnia State Life Ins. Co., 211 Cal. 176, 180 [294 P. 393, 
71 A.L.R. 137 4].) ... Normally a businessman who takes 
'comprehensive' insurance with express coverage of 'products 
property damage' would expect his ordinary transactions to 
be covered. If the insurer would create an exception to the 
general import of the principal coverage clauses, the burden 
rests upon it to phrase that exception in clear and unmistak-
able language. (Pendell v. Westland Life Ins. Co., supm, at 
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p. 770.) If this is not done any ambiguity or mwertainty is 
resolved in favor of the policyholder. Indeed an exception 
must be couched in terms whieh are dear to the ordinary 
mind (Pendell v. TFestlawl Life Ins. Co., supra, at p. 770) 
or any doubts as to the meaning will be resolved against the 
insuret·." (Ritchie v. Anehol' Casualty Co., 13;) Cal.App.2d 
245, 257-258 [28G P.2d lOOOJ.) ln view of the foregoing rule 
defeudant should uot be permitted to exdude the very type 
of coverage desired by plaintiffs by an exclusionary dause 
worded ambiguously and not called to their attention. 
I think Hauenstein v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indern. Co., 242 
Minn. 354 [G5 N.W.2d 122], supports plaintiff. rrhe eourt 
held the plaster sold by the plaintiff was the element eausing 
the damage in that case. rrhe court held that plaintiff eould 
not recover for damage to the plaster itself, but it could 
recover for damage to the building. It is an inconsequential 
distinction that the plaster had to be removed in the Hauen-
stein case but the damaged stucco in this case was merely 
covered over. 'l'he crux is that beeause of the damage the 
building's market value decreased. (Id., p. 125.) "No one 
can reasonably contend that the application of a useless 
plaster, which has to be removed before the walls can be 
properly replastered, does not lower the market value of a 
building. . . . " (I d.) The court held a proper measure of 
damages to be the cost of removing the defective plaster and 
restoring the building to its former condition. I interpret 
this to mean restoration vvith proper plastering. 
It can be argued that the Hauenstein case is distinguishable 
because the building damaged was not built by the insured. 
A company publication of the National Underwriters Com-
pany,* the "F. C. & S. Bulletins," dated August, 1955, en-
titled ''Products Liability Insurance,'' interprets the exclu-
sion here scrutinized. This publication is written for sellers 
of insurance. After diseussing the Hauenstein case it says: 
''A common source of argument-not answered by any 
decisions at present-is liability arising out of a piece of 
equipment with several distinct parts, all sold or installed by 
the same insured at the same time. Should a defect in one 
part or a faulty installation of that part damage the balanee 
of the equipment, it is not clear whether the exelusion would 
deuy eoverage for damage to the entire pieee of equipment 
or only to the portion eausing the damage.'' 
*A profit-oriented insurance enterprise. 
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Thus it is obvious that underwriters themselves are not 
certain what the paragraph in issue means. The policy to 
interpret ambiguous clauses in insurance contracts in favor 
of the insured is clearly invoked. 
I conclude that there was sufficient evidence before the trial 
court to justify its finding that the policy in issue covered 
this loss. 
It will be recalled that the trial court awarded plaintiffs 
the sum of $1,309.15 together with court costs. Defendant 
contends that even if it is liable under the policy, it is liable 
only to the extent of $1,000 under the" each accident" clause. 
'l'he policy, under the heading "Conditions" sets forth, in 
paragraph 6, "LIMITS OF LrABir~ITY, Coverage D. 'f he limit of 
property damage liability stated in the declarations as 'aggre-
gate operations' is the total limit of the company's liability for 
all damages arising out of injury to or destruction of prop-
erty, including the loss of use thereof, caused by the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of premises or operations rated upon 
a remuneration premium basis or by contractors' equipment 
rated on a receipts premium basis .... 
''The limit of property damage liability stated in the decla-
rations as 'aggregate contractual' is the total limit of the 
company's liability for all damages arising out of injury to 
or destruction of property, including the loss of usc thereof, 
with respect to each contract. 
"These limits apply separately to each project with respect 
to operations being performed away from premises owned or 
rented by the named insured.'' 
Paragraph 5 provides ''LIMITS OJ;" LIABILITY-PRODUCTs, 
Coverages B and D. 'rhc limits of bodily injury liability and 
property damage liability stated in the declarations as 'aggre-
gate products' are respectively the total limits of the com-
pany's liability for all damages arising out of the products 
hazard. All sueh damages arising out of one prepared or 
acquired lot of goods or products shall be considered as aris-
ing out of one aceident." "Products Hazard" (3(f)) as de-
fined by the policy is quoted snpra. 
The trial court found that by the terms of the contract of 
insurance defendant agreed to pay on behalf of plaintiffs all 
sums which they should beeome legally obligated to pay be-
cause of loss caused to property including the loss of use 
thereof ''by reason of the handling or use of, the existence of 
any condition in, or a warranty of goods or products manu-
factured, sold, handled or distributed by the insured plain-
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tiffs. '' Under the unquestionably ambiguous provisions 
heretofore quoted, it cannot be said that the finding is unsup-
ported by the record. An insurance policy is to be construed 
most favorably to the insured, in such a manner as to provide 
full coverage of the indicated risk rather than to narrow the 
protection (Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 
Cal.2d 423, 437-438 [296 P.2d 801, 57 A.L.R.2d 914] ; Ritchie 
v. Anchor Casualty Co., 135 Cal.App.2d 245, 257 [286 P.2d 
1000]; Glickman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 16 Cal.2d 626, 
634 [107 P.2d 252, 131 A.L.R. 1292]). If the insurer would 
create an exception to the general import of the principal 
coverage clauses, the burden rests upon it to phrase that 
exception in clear and unmistakable language. (Pendell v. 
Westland Life Ins. Co., 95 Cal.App.2d 766, 770 [214 P.2d 
392] .) 
In view of the foregoing it would seem that if, as stated by 
Mr. Justice Traynor in Bollinger v. National F1:re Ins. Co., 
25 Cal.2d 399, 405 [154 P.2d 399], "that the primary func-
tion of insurance is to insure,'' the judgment here should be 
affirmed. 
